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基于价格领导制的默契合谋与反垄断规制——来自中国白酒市场的证据

Tacit Collusion and Antitrust Regulation Based on Price Leadership——An Empirical Evidence from China’s Domestic Liquor Market

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【作者】 刘丰波吴绪亮

【Author】 LIU Feng-bo;WU Xu-liang;College of Management, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University;Center for Industrial and Business Organization,DUFE;

【机构】 福建农林大学管理学院东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心

【摘要】 价格领导制可以促进企业间信息交流,降低协调定价的不确定性,增强价格领导者维持合谋的激励,从而提高合谋稳定性。本文使用2005—2012年中国白酒市场月、季度数据,判断白酒企业之间是否存在价格领导制,识别其价格领导者,分析价格领导制是否提高了企业利润水平。结果表明,市场需求和成本变化只能部分解释白酒提价,中国白酒市场很可能存在以价格领导制为特征的默契合谋,白酒企业的提价决策深受对手提价行为的影响,且随着距离上次提价时间的推移,企业的提价激励越来越强。进一步研究显示,中国白酒市场存在稳定的价格领导者,且呈链式关系,另外价格领导制明显提升了白酒企业利润水平,说明中国白酒市场的价格领导制为主导企业式或合谋式价格领导制。这些发现在经验上从纵向差异产品角度支持了价格领导制会便利默契合谋的主流观点。本文的研究建议反垄断执法机构留心企业的序贯提价行为,以该迹象启动调查,审慎分析该行为是否构成反垄断意义的协同行为。

【Abstract】 The price leadership may facilitate information exchange between businesses, reduce the uncertainty of coordinate pricing, and may enhance the price leader’s incentive of maintaining the collusion, thus increasing the stability of collusion. Using the sample of monthly and seasonal data from China’s domestic liquor market, the paper estimate whether there exists price leadership between liquor-making firms, identify who is the leader, and determine whether the price leadership improve their profit margins significantly. The results show that the change of demand and cost can only partly explain the price rising, it’s likely exists tacit collusion in liquormaking market which is characterized by strongly price leadership, the firms’ decision to increasing price is heavily influenced by their competitor, and as time goes by the last price increase, their incentive of increasing price growing stronger. The advanced study shows that there exist a fixed leader, and their following relationship just as a chain. Moreover, the paper also finds that the price leadership improves firms’ profit margins significantly. It does reflect that the price leadership in China’s domestic branded liquor market belongs to dominant firm price leadership or collusive price leadership. These finding support the mainstream point that price leadership may facilitate tacit collusion in the view of vertically differentiated product. These findings mean that the enforcement agencies should keep an eye on sequential price rising, take it as a sign to initiate investigation,carefully analyze whether the act constituting coordination.

【基金】 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“经营者集中反垄断审查中的经济证据研究”(批准号11YJCZH189)
  • 【文献出处】 中国工业经济 ,China Industrial Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2016年04期
  • 【分类号】F426.82
  • 【被引频次】28
  • 【下载频次】3598
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