【摘要】 近几年古建筑群火灾事故的数据显示人为因素是关键诱因,为了引导投保人积极防灾,本文引入委托代理理论和博弈模型探讨古建筑群火灾保险契约模型设计。以往灾害保险合同设计只考虑灾害发生概率和损失大小,契约双方满足最优风险分担条件,并且可以得到保费与赔付函数的相关性质。加入投保人防灾努力和激励约束的契约模型,由于不对称信息,契约双方无法达到帕累托最优条件,并且投入防灾努力会加大投保人的风险分担。为了落实防灾行为,本文借鉴博尔奇经典博弈模型,引入绩效机制,在双方的对弈中加入监督要素和奖惩措施,得到重罚可以预防欺骗,加强监督和奖励会加大投保人的保费支出的结论。最后,建议调控保费、加大监督力度、引入政府第三方力量,以及加大居民防灾力度。更多还原

【Abstract】 It has been found that human factor was the key cause for ancient building fires in recent years. In order to induce the proactive disaster prevention by policyholders,the paper introduced the principal-agent model and the game theory to explore the design of the ancient architecture fire insurance contract. Traditional disaster insurance contracts only take disaster probability and losses into account,and both sides of the contract can achieve the optimal risk-sharing conditions in line with the premiums and compensation functions. When policyholders’ disaster prevention efforts and motivating and constraining effects in a principle-agent contract model are considered,the principal and agent cannot meet the Pareto optimal risk-sharing because of the information asymmetry. And the disaster prevention efforts will increase the risk-sharing by the policyholder. In order to motivate the agent to put efforts in disaster prevention,the paper referred to the Karl H. Borch classic game model to introduce join supervision and reward measures into consideration. It reached the conclusion that heavy penalties could prevent cheating,and strengthened oversight and reward would increase the premiums paid by the applicant. Finally,the paper proposed to regulate on premiums,enhance supervision and introduce a third party government force to strengthen residents’ disaster prevention.更多还原