【摘要】 压覆矿产资源管理涉及中央政府、地方政府的利益诉求,影响着国家资源战略和地方经济建设发展,问题十分复杂。运用"双重任务委托代理"模型,从压覆矿产资源管理的大局着眼,结合地方经济建设,对中央政府和地方政府在压覆矿产资源管理中存在的博弈进行分析。结果表明,地方政府对压覆矿产资源管理工作的重视程度受到风险规避特征(ρ)、工作风险程度(σ)、努力成本系数(β)、努力绩效系数(m)的影响,因此提出央地政府在压覆矿产资源管理中的对策和建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Constructed- over mineral resources management related to the central government and local government interests,affected the national resource strategy and the local economic and construction development,the problem was very complicated. this paper used "double tasks principal- agent model" to analyze the games between the central government and local government in the constructed- over mineral resources management,where the interest of central government was to develop the natural resource to its optimal level,but local government intended to safeguard the local economic and construction. The results showed that the efforts level of the local government in constructed- over mineral resources management work levelled by risk aversion( ρ),working degree of risk( σ),effort cost coefficient influence( β) and work hard coefficient( m). Finally,this paper put forward the countermeasures and suggestions of the central and local government in the constructed- over mineral resources management.更多还原