【摘要】 采用清洁发展机制下碳排放总量限制的减排政策时,企业吸引投资者对减排方面的相关技术和设备的投资非常重要。由于企业和投资者之间信息的不对称,投资者无法判断企业是高收益企业还是低收益企业。基于此,本文构建了企业和投资者之间的信号传递博弈模型,结果表明,企业用自身收益的一定比例换取投资者对新上项目的投资,对低收益企业的投资概率要大于高收益企业;在不区分企业收益情况下,进而研究了达到预期减排目标的企业和投资者之间的混同完美贝叶斯均衡策略,为投资者的投资决策提供了参考依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 When adopting the policy of the carbon emission reduction to reduce the overall carbon emissions under the Clean Development Mechanism,it is very important for enterprises to attract investment in carbon-reducing technology and equipment. An investor is unable to determine whether its investment is high-yield or not,due to the asymmetric information between the investor and the company in which it invests. In this case,this article sets up a game to facilitate the information transmission between a company and its investors,and the research shows that there is a high probability of investing in a low yield company than a high one when an enterprise offers a proportion of its profit in exchange for investment in its new project. Meanwhile,this article further studies the strategy of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium that can be used between a company whose expected emissions target has been achieved and its investors,without assessing a company’s profit level. This paper provides a reference for investors to make their investment decisions.更多还原