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国企高管薪酬决定基础:经营业绩还是盈余管理

Determining SOE Executive Pay:by Operating Results or Earnings Management?

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【作者】 张艳秋黄亚威

【Author】 ZHANG Yan-qiu;HUANG Ya-wei;School of Commerce,Jilin University;

【机构】 吉林大学商学院

【摘要】 对企业是否存在薪酬动机的盈余管理以及管理者薪酬与经营业绩的相关性进行相关研究。以剔除操控性应计利润的营业利润作为经营业绩的计量指标,发现经营业绩、操控性应计利润对管理者薪酬的解释力受到企业经营状况的影响:经营状况较好的企业,经营业绩对薪酬更具有解释力;而经营状况较差的企业,操控性应计利润对薪酬更具有解释力。研究说明,当前"里程碑式"经营业绩考核办法,诱发了国有企业管理者利润平滑行为,使盈余各组成部分与薪酬之间的相关性受到企业经营状况的影响。

【Abstract】 Having analyzed the correlation between the corporate earnings management of pay motivation and the pay with the business performance,and eliminate the operating profit margin of discretionary accruals as business performance,this paper found that business performance and discretionary accruals are affected by business conditions in explaining the salaries of managers:when the operating conditions are good,the operating performance has more explanatory power for pay;when the operating conditions are poor,the discretionary accruals has more explanatory power.This research showed that the current "milestone" business performance assessment method induces a SOE manager income smoothing behavior,so that the correlation of surplus constituents with pay is affected by business conditions.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金青年项目:“中小企业股权质押融资产品的定价研究”(71201069)
  • 【文献出处】 新疆大学学报(哲学·人文社会科学版) ,Journal of Xinjiang University(Philosophy,Humanities & Social Sciences) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2015年05期
  • 【分类号】F275;F272.92
  • 【被引频次】3
  • 【下载频次】431
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