【摘要】 目前媒体对中国食品安全事件的报道引来很大争议,主要围绕媒体偏见和媒体监管作用。本文建立了一个中央政府和地方政府食品安全监管的委托代理模型,分析在信息对称和信息不对称下,以及是否将媒体监管作为行政考核指标时的契约实施行为。研究表明,在媒体监管"激励有效"的情况下,媒体曝光可以有效增加地方政府的监管努力水平并降低中央政府的食品安全监管成本。最后,本文提出避免媒体偏见的政策建议:中国应加强对记者进行食品专业知识培训,同时加强对食品相关信息及时、准确的公布。更多还原

【Abstract】 The media effect on food safety management arises controversy,the main concern of which is whether it results from media governance or media bias. This paper sets up a central government and local government food safety regulation of principal-agent model to analyse whether the media supervision can be valued as an administrative evaluation index in the contract enforcement under the information symmetry and the information asymmetry. The results show that media exposure about food scandals can help to increase local government’s effort and decrease central government’s cost on food safety management,when the political motivation is effective. Finally,the paper puts forward that China would offer professional training to journalists and release information about food inspection accurately and timely,to avoid the negative effect of media bias.更多还原