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基于演化博弈的农村土地征收补偿分析

Analysis on the Farmland Expropriation Compensation by the Evolution Game Theory

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【作者】 罗孝玲周红星洪波

【Author】 LUO Xiao-ling;ZHOU Hong-xing;HONG Bo;Business School of Central South University;

【机构】 中南大学商学院

【摘要】 随着我国城镇化的深入,城中村及城市边缘农村成为改造、开发的主要对象,农村土地征收带来的政府与农户之间的利益矛盾也越来越突出。基于演化博弈理论,对当地政府和被征收农民的纠纷进行溯因,发现土地征收的主要症结在于当地政府是否愿意放下强势地位,让利于民,由此提出通过将地方政府声誉及公信力收益化,激励当地政府提高征地的货币补偿或提供其他生活保障,以保证农村土地征收的顺利进行。

【Abstract】 With the deepening of China’s urbanization, the "urban village" and the countryside on urban edge have become the main target of towns’ renewal and development. As a result, conflicts of interest caused by expropriation of rural land between the government and farmers are increasingly prominent. The paper tried to capture reasons of the contradiction for the land-acquisition compensation based on the evolution game theory, and out found that the main crux of land expropriation is whether local government willing to lay down a strong position to help the people. If our central administration can make the reputation and the credibility of local government accounted by revenue, which would motivate the local government to improve the compensation or supply some living supports, then it will be easier to make an agreement with the expropriated farmers.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71203241);湖南省哲学社会科学基金项目(12YBB273);湖南省博士研究生科研创新项目(CX2012B108)
  • 【文献出处】 湖北农业科学 ,Hubei Agricultural Sciences , 编辑部邮箱 ,2015年09期
  • 【分类号】D922.3;F321.1
  • 【被引频次】5
  • 【下载频次】216
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