【摘要】 在动态锦标赛环境下,采用真实努力实验方法,研究阶段性绩效信息公开与否、拆台成本高低、竞赛规则是否公平三个因素对代理人努力行为和拆台行为的影响。利用对100个被试进行的5个真实努力实验,论文得到以下结论:第一,阶段性绩效信息公开可提升代理人的努力水平,并提高最终产出。第二,提高拆台成本,可有效减少代理人的拆台行为。第三,因竞赛规则的歧视性(起点不公平)而处于劣势的代理人,并没有放弃竞赛,而是付出更高的努力水平;起点不同机制下的产出并不低于起点相同机制下的产出。第四,本研究并未发现代理人在第一阶段"保存实力"的棘轮效应,实际上代理人第一阶段的努力水平高于第二阶段,该现象支持了"职业关注"假说。更多还原

【Abstract】 The market, industry, and organizational environments, as well as international competition are complex, dynamic and uncertain with the increasing globalization. Therefore, it’s necessary to examine the agents’ behavior patterns and characteristics in a dynamic environment. For example, the promotion of employees often takes several years or even longer. Sports competitions, such as the Dakar Rally, have a number of different stages. Consequently, tournament mechanism has been studied extensively, and the dynamic tournament has also aroused the concerns of scholars. Past researches of tournament mechanisms focused on static environment. According to the principal’s institutional arrangements, agents choose their own effort level before the start of the contest throughout the whole tournaments period, and the level of effort is not changed. However, the reality is not the case. First of all, the tournament in reality is often carried out in a longer period of time and tournament mechanism has the typical characteristics of multi-stage. Secondly, factors, such as information communication, information leaks, malicious inquiry and interim evaluation, will lead to a general understanding of thecurrent state of its competitors. Based on the understanding, the agents adjust their own behaviors in if the long term exchange rate is forecasted by the theory of interest rate parity in the latter phase. Thirdly, to win the contest the agents who have learned their competitors’ performance information have two options. The first option is to improve their own level of effort, and the second option is to sabotage competitors. Finally, the unfair problem could arise if agents join the tournaments at different starting points. To enrich the current research, we adopt the real effort experiment and focus on the influences of the following factors on agents’ behavior of effort and sabotage: the existence of interim feedback(yes or no), the sabotage cost( high or low), and the starting points(same or not). A total of 100 students participated in this real effort experiment. The conclusions we draw from this study are as follows:(1) When there is no interim performance feedback, the agents can’t select the appropriate behavior according to the competitor’s level of effort and performance information. In this case, agents’ level of performance will be lower than the situation in which the interim performance information is public.(2) Sabotage will change with sabotage cost variation. If the sabotage cost is high, sabotage level will be reduced. If the sabotage cost is low, more sabotage will be seen.(3) The agents who joined the competition after the race had begun(underdogs) may not lag behind other agents(favourites). Actually the probability of winning for both sides are almost the same.(4) When the agents have the different starting points, the "unfair" phenomenon does not lead to the reduction of overall output. The overall output in this case is not necessarily lower than the case in which the starting points are the same.(5) The agents will not intentionally conceal their ability in the early stage of the dynamic tournament to confuse competitors. They will choose to improve their level of effort in each stage to maximize the total benefit instead. By doing so, the agents would make the principal believe their competence on the basis of performance in early stage. In summary, disclosing the interim performance information can stimulate agents’ effort and improve their final performances. The rise of sabotage cost will effectively reduce the agents’ sabotage behavior. Underdog, although at a disadvantage of late starting point, will endeavor to catch up with the favorites and the overall output in tournaments with different or same starting points are almost the same. Agents tend to raise the effort level in each stage. This finding supports the theory of career concerns rather than ratchet effect.更多还原