【摘要】 文章选取2004年至2011年家族上市公司为初始样本,以外聘职业经理CEO为基准,比较分析公司财务舞弊发生后家族CEO更换情况,检验家族CEO更换是否具有明显的壕沟效应,力图找到影响我国家族上市公司财务舞弊事件频发的深层原因。研究发现,上市公司家族CEO舞弊后更换比例显著高于职业经理CEO;并且,我国家族公司也没有采用为保留家族CEO而更换公司CFO的"替罪羊策略"。文章进一步研究发现,我国家族上市公司多数家族CEO兼任董事长,两职兼任的家族CEO在财务舞弊后的更换比例又显著高于其他类型的CEO。这表明在牢固掌控公司控制权的前提下,舞弊后更换家族CEO实际上是我国家族公司应对外界监管和市场压力的权宜之计,是另类"替罪羊策略"的表现。文章最后指出控制权过于集中是造成家族企业财务舞弊盛行的根本原因,并提出了解决问题的建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Family-controlled listed companies are rising day by day in China, and they have become a force that cannot be ignored in the securities market. At the same time, some problems in the development of family firms also appear gradually, and financial fraud is one of the widely concerned problems. According to previous research especially the foreign scholar’s research, we can consider CEOs who are family members do not bear the cost of replacement after financial fraud, and this is perhaps the important reason that family-controlled listed companies’ financial fraud happens. But there are differences in the market environment and the institutional background between Chinese and foreign, the conclusion of study in China may be completely different with foreign research. So studying of family member CEOs’ replacement after fraud in China’s securities market needs in-depth discussion in theory under Chinese institutional background on one hand, and needs carrying out empirical research in a meticulous and deep-going way by using large samples on the other hand.The article uses A-share family companies listed on the Chinese stock market(excluding GEM)from 2004 to 2011 as the initial study samples, and selects family companies from 2005 to 2009 to analyze the replacement of family CEOs(in contrast with outside or hired-hand CEOs) two years after the financial fraud. The paper tries to find out the deep reasons of fraud incidents in family firms. The logistic regression model shows that the replacement ratio of family CEOs increased significantly after the financial fraud. This result indicates external market and regulatory system to some extent are threatening family firms’ financial fraud. But in contrast with outside(hired-hand) CEOs, family CEOs’ replacement ratio increased obviously and the find illustrates that family CEOs do not bring entrenchment effect. Meanwhile China’s family firms also do not apply scapegoat strategy used by foreign companies to retain the founder CEO. In the further study, the paper finds out that family CEOs hold a concurrent post of chairman at a high proportion, while the replacement ratio of this part-time CEOs are significantly higher than other types of CEOs. From this we consider that under the premise of grasping the company’s control rights firmly, changing family CEOs used by family controller is only a makeshift to cope with the pressure of external market regulation, it’s another type of scapegoat strategy.The paper puts forward that if the governance structure of power-concentrated does not change, the problem that financial fraud is prevalent in family firms cannot be completely solved.At last the article points out that solving the problem of power-concentrated in family firms requires a multi-pronged approach. Firstly, it requires theorists to carry out in-depth study on the family firm’s internal governance characteristics and puts forward targeted theory. Secondly, it requires the state departments promulgates and implements reform measures, such as reforming of the financing and investing policy, completing manager market, establishing social credit mechanism and professional managers’ entering or exiting mechanism. In summary, through these efforts of theorists and practitioners, we can really reach the target of reducing financial fraud and make China’s securities market developing healthily.更多还原