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基于博弈论的铁路监管强度研究

The research on regulation of railway based on game theory

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【作者】 姬志洲陈治亚冯芬玲汤子文

【Author】 JI Zhizhou;CHEN Zhiya;FENG Fenling;TANG Ziwen;School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering,Central South University;

【机构】 中南大学交通运输工程学院

【摘要】 铁路运输监管是保证铁路运输服务质量的重要措施,为研究铁路监管部门的最优监管概率,结合中国铁路运输的实际情况,构建铁路运输监管部门与铁路运输企业之间的博弈模型,得到不同情况下监管部门的最优监管强度和对应强度下铁路运输企业的服务满意度。通过对模型结果的分析表明,监管部门的监管强度与运输市场竞争大小、铁路运输技术水平以及铁路运输企业违规处罚力度有关,进而提出铁路运输监管部门可从促进运输市场竞争,提高铁路运输技术水平以及加大违规处罚力度3个方面来提高铁路运输服务质量。

【Abstract】 Railway transportation regulation is an important mean to ensure the quality of railway transportation service. To study the game between railway regulation and company,combined with the practical situation of China railway transportation,this paper built the game model between the railway transport regulators and the railway transport enterprise. The model analysis showed that the rational regulation of railway transportation is related to transport market competition,technological level of rail transport and railway transport enterprises violation penalties. In order to improve the quality of railway,regulators can begin with improving the level of railway technology,promoting competition in the transport market and increasing the penalties.

【关键词】 博弈论铁路监管强度
【Key words】 game theoryrailway regulationstrength
【基金】 中国铁路总公司科技研究开发计划资助项目(2014x009-1)
  • 【文献出处】 铁道科学与工程学报 ,Journal of Railway Science and Engineering , 编辑部邮箱 ,2015年03期
  • 【分类号】F532;F224.32
  • 【被引频次】13
  • 【下载频次】285
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