【摘要】 文章基于中国政治晋升和"财政联邦主义"双重激励下地方政府如何利用税收自主权发展区域经济的背景,利用2000-2011年中国省域面板数据和空间联立方程模型,研究区域税负水平与空间集聚的内生关系和集聚是否对企业产生锁定效应及其区域差异等问题。结果表明:中国地方政府间存在不同策略的税收竞争行为但没有导致"逐底竞争"现象;省域税负水平与空间集聚间呈现倒U形内生关系和"天花板"效应;两者在"天花板"出现之前表现出正向内生关系,空间集聚降低了公司对税收竞争的敏感性,对企业区位产生锁定效应,使地方政府和企业实现集聚租金收益;但这种关系以及税收竞争程度和策略具有明显的区域特征。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the background of how to use tax autonomy to develop regional economy by local governments under dual incentives of political promotion and fiscal federalism,this paper studies issues like the endogenous relation between regional tax burden level and spatial agglomeration,and the lock-in effect of agglomeration on enterprises & regional differences by using Chinese provincial panel data from 2000 to 2011and spatial simultaneous equations model.It comes to the following results:firstly,there exists different strategy tax competition behavior among local governments but it does not result in"get-to-zero competition";secondly,the relationship between tax burden at provincial level and spatial agglomeration is featured by the inverted U-shape endogeneity and the celling effect;thirdly,before reaching the celling,the relationship between tax burden at provincial level and spatial agglomeration is featured by the positive endogeneity;spatial agglomeration helps to reduce firms’ sensitivity to tax completion and has lock-in effect on firm location,leading to the realization of the agglomeration of rents by local governments and firms;fourthly,this relationship and tax competition level &strategy vary widely with regions.更多还原