【摘要】 通过构建完全信息动态博弈模型,对政府和农民集体围绕小产权房的利益博弈进行了分析。结果表明:双方博弈的动机来源于对集体建设用地入市的增值收益的分割;而现行土地制度安排下,农民集体在博弈中的最优行动选择是进行小产权房的供地交易,政府的最优行动选择则是默认,这一均衡结果又受到了政府土地制度创新的有效性、农民集体在公开土地市场的收益以及小产权房开发的违法成本等因素的强化。在此基础上,提出了构建城乡统一建设用地市场、提高征地补偿安置标准、明确小产权房的处罚措施等政策建议来遏制小产权房的扩大化。更多还原

【Abstract】 The thesis using a complete information dynamic game model analyzes the benefits game around limited property house between government and peasant collective.The game motivation for both sides origins from the distribution of added value benefits,which comes from entering the collective construction land into to capital market.But under the current arrangement land system,the optimal choice in the benefits game for the peasant collective is to transaction the land of limited house properties,and for the government the optimal choice is to default it.So that is the cause of limited property house.The equilibrium result above the paper is affected by the factors like innovation effectiveness of government land system,the income of peasant collective on in the open land market and the illegal cost in developing the limited property houses.so this paper puts forward forming a unified construction land market in urban and rural,increasing the land expropriation compensation level,clearing up the punitive measures of limited property houses and other policy suggestions to restrain the expansion of limited property house.更多还原