【摘要】 商业银行股权结构竞争均衡的核心是控制权争夺。拥有控制权的一方不仅能获得银行价值增值所带来的投资收益,还可能获得各种非投资收益,这些由控制权带来的、超过投资收益的各类收益就是"控制权收益"。本文通过构建控制权收益模型能较好地解释现实中银行股权结构的竞争均衡,结果发现监管者可以通过控制对小股东的"制裁成本"来影响其在具有竞争力差异的国外战略投资者和国有大股东之间的选择,并在此基础上提出以国外战略投资者参与为代表的多利益主体对控制权收益的竞争,不会降低股份制银行的价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 To competing for the controlling stake is the core of the competitive equilibrium ownership structure of commercial banks. The party who has the controlling stake will not only get the investment income brought about by the bank value added,may also get a variety of non- investment income. All the non- investment income which come from the controlling stake is considered to be the benefits of control.This article can explain the competitive equilibrium analysis of bank ownership structure effectively by using the benefits of control model and draw the conclusion that the supervisor can affect minority shareholder’s choice between the large state- owned shareholders and the strategic investors by Controlling sanctions costs,and then pointed out that the introduction of strategic investors to the multi- stakeholder will not reduce the value of the bank.更多还原