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基于博弈论的技术标准竞争中风险与知识产权的研究(英文)

Risk and Intellectual Property in Technical Standard Competition:A Game Theory Perspective

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【作者】 徐超峰范伟民王长峰忻展红

【Author】 XU Chaofeng;FAN Weimin;WANG Changfeng;XIN Zhanhong;School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications;

【机构】 School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

【摘要】 Technical standard is typically characterized by network effect.The key point for a technical standard is the consumers’ choice,which is based on consumers’ maximum benefits.When a technical standard becomes a national standard,its interests have been integrated into the national interests.National interests are divided into economic profits and security factors.From the perspective of consumers’ choice,this paper deals with the main factors which affect the result of technical standard competition- the risk and profits of intellectual property based on the assumption of bounded rationality and dynamic game theory.

【Abstract】 Technical standard is typically characterized by network effect.The key point for a technical standard is the consumers’ choice,which is based on consumers’ maximum benefits.When a technical standard becomes a national standard,its interests have been integrated into the national interests.National interests are divided into economic profits and security factors.From the perspective of consumers’ choice,this paper deals with the main factors which affect the result of technical standard competition- the risk and profits of intellectual property based on the assumption of bounded rationality and dynamic game theory.

  • 【文献出处】 中国通信 ,China Communications , 编辑部邮箱 ,2014年05期
  • 【分类号】F204;F224.32
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】169
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