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寡头双渠道古诺博弈模型—兼议苏宁双渠道同价策略
A Dual-channel Cournot Game Model with Remarks on the Policy of Equal Prices on the Two Channels of Suning
【摘要】 基于双渠道古诺博弈模型,本文比较了三种不同情况下的渠道选择博弈及其均衡。分析发现在这三种情况下,降低某渠道的单位变动运营成本,提高消费者对某渠道的偏好程度,以及在避开"差异化陷阱"的条件下扩大某渠道与其他渠道的差异,都可以增加该渠道的均衡销量;而博弈结果是视具体参数而定的,任何情况下均为最优的渠道选择是不存在的;一般情况下,企业兼营双渠道时,设置相同的线下和线上价格是一种缺乏经济效率的安排。这也意味着,苏宁选择双渠道同价策略,可能无法实现双渠道经营下的最优定价。
【Abstract】 Based on a Cournot duopoly model of dual-channel competition,this paper analyzes and compares the equilibrium of games of three different situations. The findings are: decreasing the unit variable cost of operation,increasing the degree of consumer preference,and differentiating one channel from the other under a certain conditions will increase the equilibrium sales in quantity of this channel; generally,to set an equal price for both channels is out of the optimal choice for a firm,which in turn indicates that Suning may not set the optimal price for its dual-channel operation.
【Key words】 dual-channel competition; duopoly; Cournot game; optimal price-setting;
- 【文献出处】 预测 ,Forecasting , 编辑部邮箱 ,2014年05期
- 【分类号】F721;F274
- 【被引频次】31
- 【下载频次】968