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标准设定动因下企业R&D联盟的进化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise R&D Alliance Motivated by Standard Formulation
【摘要】 借鉴进化博弈理论分析企业R&D联盟过程中的竞争与合作,通过引入边际技术含量的收益参数,构建了标准设定动因下企业R&D联盟的进化博弈模型,分析了初始状态及各参量变化对联盟进化行为的影响,得出了联盟中单个企业和整体利益最大化的条件,并提出了企业R&D联盟的管理应以长远利益为目标,减小超额收益、增加联盟的净利润以及推出被市场广为接受的行业技术标准以促进联盟稳定的建议。
【Abstract】 This paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyse the competition and cooperation of enterprise R&D alliance, and the evolutionary game model on enterprise R&D alliance motivated by standard formulation is built through introducing mariginal income parameter of technique content. Then the effects on evolutionary activities of the alliance are analysed according to the initial state and change of the parameter. Therefore,the conditions of maximizing profits are obtained for individual enterprise and the alliance. Finally,some management suggestion of seeking the long-term goals,reducing extra return,increasing net profit and formulating an industry technology standard are put forward to consolidate stability of the alliance.
【Key words】 standard formulation; evolutionary game; extra return; R&D net profit;
- 【文献出处】 软科学 ,Soft Science , 编辑部邮箱 ,2014年01期
- 【分类号】F273.1;F224.32
- 【被引频次】7
- 【下载频次】210