【摘要】 针对来料缺陷,基于合作博弈及Shapley讨价还价理论,探讨了供应链质量双边谈判问题。首先,探讨了非合作博弈的情形,并进一步探讨了矩阵博弈框架及合作环境下的质量最优合同设计。给出了供应链质量双边谈判的Shapley讨价还价解及解的内涵、特征结构及价值。合作环境下的质量双边谈判Pareto最优解与分销商检验策略无关,但与谈判现状点的选取有关。供应商的谈判价值与分销商检验水平正相关,与其所分担的外部故障成本比例反相关。分销商的谈判价值随其检验水平先提高后降低,与供应商承担外部故障成本比例正相关。Shapley讨价还价谈判结果对供销双方均有利,供应商将获得最小的谈判结果,而分销商将获得最大的谈判结果。最后,通过数值分析,验证了上述研究结果。更多还原

【Abstract】 Facing raw materials defects,based on the cooperation game and Shapley bargaining theory,we discuss the problem of supply chain quality bilateral negotiation.We first discuss the non-cooperative conditions,and then apply Shapley bargaining theory to study the optimal supply chain quality contract design under the framework of a matrix game and cooperative game.We give the Shapley bargaining solution of quality bilateral negotiation,content,feature structure and value of the solution.Under cooperative environment,the Pareto optimal solution of quality bilateral negotiation is not correlated to the inspection strategy of the retailer,but does correlate to the status quo of point selection in negotiation.The negotiation value of the supplier is correlated to the inspection level of the distributor but is negatively related to the proportion of external fault cost with which the supplier should share.The negotiation value of the distributor is correlated to the proportion of external fault cost with which the supplier should share and will firstly increases then decreases when its inspection level increases.Compared with the noncooperative negotiation,the cooperative environment and the negotiation result of Shapley bargaining solution is a win-win situation where the supplier will obtain the minimum negotiation result but theretailer will get the maximum negotiation result.We verify these results with numerical analysis and show the tendency of promoting the two side successful bilateral negotiation about supply chain quality.更多还原