【摘要】 近年来,P2P网络借贷平台迅速发展,但是由于借贷双方的信息不对称引发了平台中的逆向选择和道德风险问题,进而造成了平台严重的资金安全问题。在前人研究的基础上,构建了一个P2P网络借贷平台中的"柠檬"模型和不确定性的委托—代理模型,对平台内存在的逆向选择和道德风险进行分析。结果发现,信号传递博弈模型可以解决平台内的逆向选择问题,而信用担保的介入则可以防范平台中的道德风险。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years,the P2 P lending platform develops fast. But because the asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders leads to the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the platform,there arises serious problems of funds security on the platform. In this paper,on the basis of the previous research,we build a P2 P lending platform of"lemon"model and uncertainty principal- agent model to analyze the adverse selection and moral hazard inside the platform. This paper proves that the signaling game model can solve the problem of adverse selection within the platform,and the credit guaranty can prevent moral hazard of the platform.更多还原