【摘要】 本文以2013年12月31日之前所有风险资本支持的以IPO方式在沪、深两市成功退出的433个项目为研究样本,从投资项目的视角实证检验了主导VC机构的分阶段投资策略对其退出时投资绩效的影响以及影响机理。研究发现,就分阶段投资策略与投资绩效的关系而言,主导VC机构的分阶段投资策略对其退出时的投资绩效具有显著的负向影响。关于分阶段投资策略对投资绩效的作用机理,一方面套牢风险会对主导VC机构分阶段投资策略与其项目层面投资绩效之间的关系产生影响,当套牢风险较大时,主导VC机构分阶段投资策略对投资绩效具有提升作用,然而当套牢风险较小时,主导VC机构分阶段投资策略对投资绩效产生不利影响,证实了套牢假设;另一方面直接监督成本未对主导VC机构分阶段投资策略与投资绩效之间的关系产生影响,即否定了代理成本假设,支持了学习假设。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the data of 433 successful VC( Venture Capital) projects that have exited through IPO on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange before December 31,2013,this paper empirically tests the impact of grading investment strategies on the investment performance of leading VC institutions from the perspective of investment projects and their mechanism. The results show that,as to the relationship between grading investment strategies and investment performance,grading investment strategies of leading VC institutions have significantly negative effects on their investment performance when they exit. As to the functional mechanism of joint investment strategies on investment performance,on the one hand,risk of being in the court can influence the relationship between the leading VC institutions’ grading investment strategies and investment performance of projects. When the risk of being in the court is relatively high,grading investment strategies of leading VC institutions play an upgrading role in investment performance. But when the risk of being in the court is relatively low,the grading investment strategies of VC institutions have adverse effects on investment performance,supporting the hypotheses of being in the court. On the other hand,the direct supervising cost has no impacts on the relationship between the leading VC institutions’ grading investment strategies and investment performance,supporting the learning hypotheses but being inconsistent with the agency cost hypotheses.更多还原