【摘要】 本文研究由一个零售商及一个有促销行为的供应商组成供应链的协调问题.利用博弈论及比较静态分析法,得到如下结论:回购契约下,零售商的订货量是供应商的促销努力水平的增函数;在一定条件下,供应商的促销努力水平是零售商的订货量的增函数;回购契约不能协调该供应链;回购契约-促销成本分担契约协调供应商促销的供应链.此外,回购-促销成本分担契约中的促销成本分担因子在满足参与约束的前提下,能够使得供应商与零售商之间任意分配供应链的利润.更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper focuses on the coordination of a supply chain consisted of one retailer and one supplier,which the supplier must expend promoting cost.By game theory and the method of comparative static analysis,we derive the conclusions as follows:the retailer’s order quantity increases with the supplier’s sales efforts level;the buyback contract stimulates the retailer order more but cannot coordinate the supply chain;a contract combined the buyback contract and promotional cost-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain.In addition,the promotional cost-sharing factor,which satisfies participating in constraint,can arbitrary allocate supply chain profit between the supplier and retailer.The numerical results give more insight of the model.更多还原