节点文献
终极控制股东、两权分离与公司并购绩效
Ultimate Controlling Shareholders 、the separation of Two Right and the performance of acquirers
【摘要】 以2007-2010年我国上市公司的股权收购、资产收购以及直接吸收合并等扩张性并购事件为研究对象,实证检验终极控制股东的现金流权以及两权分离对公司并购绩效的影响。研究结果表明:大部分的收购公司并购后1-2年内股东财富都遭受了严重的损失;终极控制股东的现金流权对公司并购绩效具有"激励效应",而现金流权与控制权的分离会导致公司并购绩效的恶化。进一步研究还发现,公司高自由现金流和低成长性会加强两权分离对公司并购绩效的负向影响,并且两权分离对公司并购绩效的负面影响在民营上市公司更加显著。
【Abstract】 On the basis of non-financial listed companies’ expansion of M&A events from 2007 to 2010,this paper investigates the relationship between the separation of controlling right from cash flow right and the performance of acquirers.The results show that shareholders of the majority acquiring firms suffer significant wealth loss in one to two years after M&A;the cash-flow rights of the ultimate controllers has "incentive effect" to the performance of acquirers,but the separation of controlling rights from cash flow rights have negative influence on the performance of acquirers.we also find that,the negative effect is more serious in low growth and high free-cash flow corporations,and is more significant in non-state-owned corporations.
【Key words】 ultimate controlling shareholders; cash-flow rights; controlling right; the separation of Two Right; the performance of acquirers;
- 【文献出处】 现代财经(天津财经大学学报) ,Modern Finance and Economics-Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2013年07期
- 【分类号】F271;F832.51;F224
- 【被引频次】23
- 【下载频次】695