【摘要】 本文建立了小额贷款公司与监管者之间的博弈模型,利用了不完全信息静态博弈原理,采用混合战略模型,得出了博弈主体之间最大化效用时的均衡状态解,并进一步分析了在双方博弈过程中各种现实因素对均衡状态解的影响,得出了对违规者的处罚及处罚力度、违规者的违规成本、违规被发现所带来的负面影响、违规所带来的违规收益;对监管者失职的处罚即处罚力度、监管者的检查成本、监管者对未来的期望、违规者向监管者提供的公关费用;违规被查出的时间距案发的时间间隔等因素都会对博弈的均衡概率产生一定的影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper established the game model between the Small loan company and its supervisor’s.Making use of the incomplete information static game theory and the mixed strategy to turn out the balance between the both sides of the game and their max profits.And it also analyses the impacts on the process of realizing the balance.Concluding that the punishment to the violator and its intensity,the cost of the offenders,the side effects of the offenders and the profits of being offended.And it also concluding that the punishment to the supervisor who lost their duty,the cost of the supervisor,the side effects of being found disobey the rule,the expectation of the supervisor and the offenders’ fare to the supervisor.The time which the offenders disobey the rule and its interval also has an impact on the balance of the game.更多还原