【摘要】 进入21世纪以来,以世界遗产为代表的公共资源景区门票价格的上涨引起了景区管理机构与公众之间的争论,双方就景区涨价是否为了调节客流以利于资源保护形成了不同的意见。文章从厂商成本理论出发,结合准公共产品的定价原则,论证了公共资源景区门票价格与负荷强度之间存在U型曲线的理论关系。文章利用国家假日办国庆"黄金周"2002～2010年重点监测的59个公共资源景区数据,使用了多因素方差分析和面板数据固定效应回归模型,研究发现:(1)景区门票价格差异主要受景区个体特征所影响,公共资源景区之间存在较强的异质性。(2)世界遗产和位于地级市郊区是影响门票价格的重要个体特征;位于郊区的景区门票价格偏高,反映了借鉴"西湖免费模式"存在的巨大障碍,也反映了景区的可进入性较差从而依赖团队游客对门票定价的影响。(3)全部样本景区门票价格看似与其平均负荷强度呈现U型曲线关系,但这只是由于没有考虑到样本异质性的结果。进一步研究发现,市区景区门票价格与其平均负荷强度的确存在U型曲线关系,不过总体来说,目前这种边际效应为负;而世界遗产景区却不存在这种曲线关系,"调节客流论"在很大程度上可以被认为是管理机构利用景区强大的市场势力实行垄断定价的借口。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the mid-1990s,the management rights of Public Scenery Spots(PSS) in China have been decentralized and the entrance fees have become more freely adjustable.Increased PSS entrance fees have recently become a popularly discussed issue and have caused widespread concern in the community.Debate on the entrance fees to PSS can be traced back to the adjustment hearing of the entrance fees of Beijing World Heritage Scenery Spots(WHSS),which was held on 30 November 2004.The relevant departments have explained the reason for increasing PSS entrance fees from four aspects.The most important of these aspects is that the WHSS uses price leverage to control overload,which would otherwise not be conducive to the protection of cultural relics.Although other PSS management agents have widely quoted this interpretation in subsequent hearings,the public have queried whether increased entrance fees are really intended to control tourist flow.Scholars who oppose increases in WHSS entrance fees have thought that this measure will have little effect because WHSS are generally scarce,unique,have a high monopoly,and the price elasticity of their demand is very small.Correspondingly,many scholars have thought that the real reasons for these price increases include:(1) localization of public interests;(2) income orientation of PSS;(3) monopolization of PSS;(4) multiple regulatory authorities of PSS;(5) a single source of income from PSS;(6) unsatisfactory price hearings;(7) effects of increasing entrance fees;(8) the technical and institutional tourism supply and demand contradiction;(9) rebates for travel agents and tour guides;and(10),fragmented tourism markets. This paper is based on the concept of manufacturer’s cost theory,which is combined with quasi-public goods pricing principles to demonstrate the theoretical relationship of a "U"-shaped curve between entrance fees and PSS load intensity.Panel data have been used,including data from fifty-nine key PPS that were monitored by the National Holiday Office between 2002 and 2010.In addition,a multi-factor analysis of variance and fixed effects regression model is employed.First,this study has found that the differences of entrance fees are mainly affected by the individual characteristics of the PSS,the study samples are obviously heterogeneous.Second,important individual characteristics that affect entrance fees include whether the scenery spots are located in suburbs or are WHSS,whose charges are twenty to fifty Yuan higher than other PSS.The higher entrance fees of scenery spots that are located in suburbs reflect a huge obstacle to the mode of "free charge West Lake".They also reflect the accessibility of PSS and the reliance on team tourists,which influence the entrance fees.Third,the entrance fees appear to be impacted by changes in the average load intensity,although this result does not take into account the sample’s heterogeneity.Further studies show that the average load intensity of urban scenery spots has indeed had an impact on entrance fees;however,this marginal effect is negative.On the other hand,WHSS entrance fees are not subject to load intensity."Regulating passenger flow theory" can be considered to be used as an excuse to implement monopoly pricing by the management agencies that depend on their strong market power.更多还原