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关于企业债务纠纷的博弈分析
Analysis about Debt Disputes among Enterprises Based on the Bargaining Game Theory
【摘要】 企业间的债务纠纷体现在应收账款收不回来。债权人通过民事诉讼的方式解决债务纠纷,一般都面临久拖不决、旷日持久、劳财费力、得不偿失的局面。引入讨价还价模型,力图从博弈论的角度找寻另一种解决企业间债务纠纷的处理方法。模型分析结果得出,债权人和债务人讨价还价的子博弈精炼纳什均衡结果是双方综合贴现因子的函数。贴现因子大的一方通常是债务人,其在谈判中可以获得更多的收益。谈判的回合越多越长,最终均衡的偿债比例越小,债务人可以享受的债务减轻比例越大。
【Abstract】 Enterprise’s debt dispute is mostly reflected in that money on receivable accounts couldn’t be paid back on time. Creditor generally faced a depressing situation characterized with long time delaying and high cost consuming if he tried to resolve the above debt dispute by the legal means. Hence,we try to find a new way available to handle this problem based on the bargaining game theory. The result of model analysis is that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game is a function of both parties’ comprehensive discount factor,and that the debtor usually has a bigger discount factor and so can get more income. Especially,the more negotiation rounds they carry on,the smaller equilibrium debt service ratio is and the greater proportion of debt relief the debtor will ultimately gain.
【Key words】 debt disputes; bargaining; subgame perfect nash equilibrium;
- 【文献出处】 黎明职业大学学报 ,Journal of Liming Vocational University , 编辑部邮箱 ,2013年04期
- 【分类号】F275
- 【被引频次】1
- 【下载频次】81