【摘要】 本文研究投资银行的政治联系在上市公司增发中的作用。通过收集1998年至2010年上市公司增发中所聘请的投资银行数据,发现在增发申请通过率环节,在控制了样本自选择效应后,投行政治联系发挥了关键作用,而且在冷市场环境和客户重要性程度较高的场景下,投行政治联系对提高增发申请通过率发挥了更为重要的作用;而在增发申请获批的时间上,投行政治联系没有单独发挥作用,但在冷市场环境下投行政治联系有助于缩短增发获批时间。在经济后果方面,我们发现有政治联系的投行所承销的增发其未来一年市场表现更差。本文的研究结论拓展了关于投行在融资中的作用以及关于政治联系的研究文献,并且研究了投行政治联系在不同场景下的作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 This study examines the role of political connection of underwriters in secondary equity offering(SEO).By using data of SEOs during the period of 1998- 2010,we investigate the impact of underwriter’s political connection on the likelihood of getting approval for SEO and the length of waiting for approval,and we further examine whether underwriter’s political connection affects future stock performance of SEOs.We find that after controlling for sample self- selection,underwriter’s political connection increases the likelihood of getting approval in general.Further investigation indicates that this effect is more dominant in the cold market or when the fees from the SEO firm significantly affect the underwriter’s performance.In addition,the length of waiting for approval is significantly shorter for politically- connected underwriters in the cold market Finally,we find some evidence that SEOs underwritten by politically- connected underwriters perform worse after the SEO.更多还原