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竞争情报系统质量控制的实施:Nash均衡与甄别

Quality Control Implementation of CI System: Nash Equilibrium and Screening

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【作者】 于海东罗云峰

【Author】 YU Hai-dong;LUO Yun-feng;College of Electrical Engineering and New Energy,China Three Gorges University;Library of China Three Gorges University;School of Automation,Huazhong University of Science and Technology;

【机构】 三峡大学电气与新能源学院三峡大学图书馆华中科技大学自动化学院

【摘要】 竞争情报系统可以提升利用复杂数据集合获取知识和洞见的能力,为确保其实用性和安全性,有必要对其质量控制的实施进行关注。通过设计合理机制可以帮助企业事前从服务商群体里识别最优服务商,以确保竞争情报系统的质量标准。研究表明:企业对服务商的财务补偿比例可以逆向调控服务商前期对系统的R&D经费投入,以达到企业的期望值。在此基础上,本文构造企业甄别竞标入围服务商能力的博弈模型,为竞争情报系统质量标准的合理制订提供了定量描述依据。

【Abstract】 Competitive intelligence system enhances the ability of using huge amounts of complex data sets to obtain knowledge and insight,which ensures its practicality and security.Thus it is necessary to pay attention to the quality control of competitive intelligence system. For guaranteing the quality standard of competitive intelligence system,rational mechanism design can help the enterprise to identify the most optimal from the service provider groups in advance. The research shows that financial compensation proportion could regulate R&D spending adversely as much as the enterprise had expected.Furthermore,it constructs a game model for the enterprise to screen the ability of shortlisted service providers and provides a quantitative description in formulating reasonable quality standard of competitive intelligence system.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101058)
  • 【文献出处】 广西师范大学学报(自然科学版) ,Journal of Guangxi Normal University(Natural Science Edition) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2013年04期
  • 【分类号】G350
  • 【下载频次】70
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