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零售商风险厌恶情形下的契约协调
Contract Coordination in a Environment of Retailer’s Risk Aversion
【摘要】 基于报童模型,对一个由风险中性的制造商和风险厌恶型零售商所组成的供应链系统,用凹增的效用函数来刻画零售商的风险厌恶,探讨了风险厌恶引起零售商订货量降低的深层次原因,并设计实物期权契约对供应链进行协调。研究表明,风险厌恶引起零售商订货量降低的深层次原因是实际超储成本的增大;通过实物期权契约可对此进行协调,制造商可设计适宜的契约参数使供应链利润最大化,这和前人的研究结果是相反的;协调的实物期权契约显示出很好的柔性,零售商风险厌恶程度越高,他所取得的供应链利润份额越大,制造商提供给他的期权价越低,执行价越高。
【Abstract】 Using a concave utility function to depict retailer’s risk aversion in a supply chain which is comprised of a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer,this paper discusses the cause why the retailer reduces the order quantity under risk aversion based on Newsboy model.And a real option contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain.The results show that the reason is the retailer’s increased effective overage cost caused by risk aversion.The results also show that through a real option contract,the manufacturer can maximize the supply chain’s profit by properly designing the contract parameters,which is in contrast to the result of existing research.The third result show that the coordinated real option contract is of good flexibility,i.e.,the more risk-averse retailer,the greater share of his profit and the lower option price the manufacturer provides,the higher exercise price.
- 【文献出处】 管理学报 ,Chinese Journal of Management , 编辑部邮箱 ,2013年12期
- 【分类号】F274;F224;F713.32
- 【被引频次】21
- 【下载频次】351