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我国碳排放总量控制交易的分配机制设计——基于欧盟排放交易体系的经验
The Design of Allocation Mechanism under Cap-and-trade in China——Based on the Experience of EU ETS
【摘要】 本文归纳了欧盟排放交易体系配给机制的特征,采用文献分析法对配给机制的环境效益与经济效益进行评估。欧盟排放交易体系第一阶段实现了减排,第二阶段不存在过度配给,故减排能力将有所提高,但对节能减排技术投资的引致效应有限。碳配额带来的经济租金对企业竞争力的影响较小,但意外收益的存在导致了收入分配的扭曲。结合我国的经济发展路径,本文认为我国应加快完善碳市场的顶层设计,制定排放交易体系的纲领性指引,在国家五年规划中明确减排目标,将交通、农业等排放量较大且边际减排成本较低的行业融入到管控对象之中,由各个省份制定本省的分配细则,以基准排放作为分配原则,采用100%拍卖的形式,建立健全配给机制的配套政策安排。
【Abstract】 We summarize the characteristics of the allocation mechanism in the context of EU ETS,and then evaluate the environmental and economic benefits of the allocation mechanism based on current literature.The conclusion reveals that EU has achieved abatement during the trial phase,and the capacity of abatement would increase in the second phase due to the absence of over-allocation.However,the investment in energy saving technology induced by the allocation mechanism is limited.According to the economic effect,the rents brought by mandatory carbon quota have little impact on the competitiveness of enterprises,but the existence of the windfall led to distortions in income distribution.Combining the path of economic development in China and the experience of EU ETS,we argue that it is essential for China to accelerate toplevel design to improve the carbon market.First of all,we should develop programmatic guidelines for emissions trading system,involve clear emission reduction targets in the country’s five-year plan,bring the transportation,agriculture and other industries with higher emissions and lower marginal abatement costs under control.It is advantageous to transfer the responsibility of enacting allocation rules to provinces,and distribute with baseline emissions as the principle and in the form of a 100% auction.Besides,establishing and perfecting the supporting policy arrangements is necessary.
【Key words】 European Union Emission Trading Scheme; Allocation Mechanism; Environmental Effect; Economic Effect;
- 【文献出处】 国际金融研究 ,Studies of International Finance , 编辑部邮箱 ,2013年07期
- 【分类号】X196
- 【被引频次】27
- 【下载频次】1260