节点文献

Effect of Aspiration and Mean Gain on the Emergence of Cooperation in Unidirectional Pedestrian Flow

  • 推荐 CAJ下载
  • PDF下载
  • 不支持迅雷等下载工具,请取消加速工具后下载。

【作者】 王子洋马剑赵晖秦勇朱伟贾利民

【Author】 WANG Zi-Yang 1,2, MA Jian3,4 ZHAO Hui 1 QIN Yong 2 ZHU Wei 5,6 and JIA Li-Min 2, 1 School of Traffic and Transportation,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China 2 State Key Laboratory of Railway Control and Safety,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China 3 School of Transportation and Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China 4 State Key Laboratory of Fire Science,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China 5 Key Lab of Public Safety,Beijing Academy of Science and Technology,Beijing 100083,China 6 Beijing Research Center of Urban Systems Engineering,Beijing Academy of Science and Technology,Beijing 100083,China

【机构】 School of Traffic and Transportation,Beijing Jiaotong UniversityState Key Laboratory of Railway Control and Safety,Beijing Jiaotong UniversitySchool of Transportation and Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong UniversityState Key Laboratory of Fire Science,University of Science and Technology of ChinaKey Lab of Public Safety,Beijing Academy of Science and TechnologyBeijing Research Center of Urban Systems Engineering,Beijing Academy of Science and Technology

【摘要】 When more than one pedestrian want to move to the same site,conflicts appear and thus the involved pedestrians play a motion game.In order to describe the emergence of cooperation during the conflict resolving process,an evolutionary cellular automation model is established considering the effect of aspiration and mean gain.In each game,pedestrian may be gentle cooperator or aggressive defector.We propose a set of win-stay-lose-shrift WSLS like rules for updating pedestrian’s strategy.These rules prescribe that if the mean gain of current strategy between some given steps is larger than aspiration the strategy keeps,otherwise the strategy changes.The simulation results show that a high level aspiration will lead to more cooperation.With the increment of the statistic length,pedestrians will be more rational in decision making.It is also found that when the aspiration level is small enough and the statistic length is large enough all the pedestrian will turn to defectors.We use the prisoner’s dilemma model to explain it.At last we discuss the effect of aspiration on fundamental diagram.

【Abstract】 When more than one pedestrian want to move to the same site,conflicts appear and thus the involved pedestrians play a motion game.In order to describe the emergence of cooperation during the conflict resolving process,an evolutionary cellular automation model is established considering the effect of aspiration and mean gain.In each game,pedestrian may be gentle cooperator or aggressive defector.We propose a set of win-stay-lose-shrift WSLS like rules for updating pedestrian’s strategy.These rules prescribe that if the mean gain of current strategy between some given steps is larger than aspiration the strategy keeps,otherwise the strategy changes.The simulation results show that a high level aspiration will lead to more cooperation.With the increment of the statistic length,pedestrians will be more rational in decision making.It is also found that when the aspiration level is small enough and the statistic length is large enough all the pedestrian will turn to defectors.We use the prisoner’s dilemma model to explain it.At last we discuss the effect of aspiration on fundamental diagram.

【关键词】 cooperationevolutionary gameaspirationmean gain
【Key words】 cooperationevolutionary gameaspirationmean gain
【基金】 Supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant No.2013JBM048;the China National Natural Science Foundation under Grant Nos.71103148,70901007;the SKLFS Program(HZ2010-KF02);the Doctoral Fund of Ministry of Education of China under Grant Nos.20090009120014;the State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety under Grant Nos.RCS2009K004,RCS2010ZT005,Beijing Jiaotong University
  • 【文献出处】 Communications in Theoretical Physics ,理论物理通讯(英文版) , 编辑部邮箱 ,2013年03期
  • 【分类号】U491.25
  • 【下载频次】49
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络