【摘要】 保险公司经理人的风险承担行为受到外部监管和内部治理的双重约束,两者可能存在"替代效应"或"促进效应",不同的关系可能对保险公司风险承担产生不同的影响。本文选取我国18家产险公司2005~2011年的数据,通过构建联立方程组的方法实证检验现阶段我国保险业外部监管和内部治理对产险公司风险承担的影响,产险公司的风险分为杠杆风险、承保风险和投资风险。研究发现:外部监管在一定程度上替代了内部治理,发挥着对产险公司杠杆风险的监督作用,两者存在"替代"关系;外部监管和内部治理都能够同时有效抑制产险公司承保风险的提高,两者存在"互补"的关系;外部监管和内部治理与投资风险的改变均不显著,两者之间没有发现"替代"或"互补"关系。更多还原

【Abstract】 Managers’ risk-taking behavior of insurance companies is constrained by both external regulation and internal governance.There may exist a "substitution effect" or a "facilitation effect" between these two factors which may pose different impacts on insurers’ risk-taking behaviors.This paper selected 18 property and casualty insurers’ data from 2005 to 2011 in China,and constructed simultaneous equations to empirically test the impact of external regulation and internal governance to property and casualty insurers’ risk-taking behaviors.Property and casualty insurers’ risks include leverage risk,underwriting risk and investment risk.The research found that:(1)external regulation to some extent replaced the internal governance,supervising property and casualty insurers’ leverage risks,and there existed a "substitution" relationship between these two factors;(2)both external regulation and internal governance could curb the rise of underwriting risks effectively,and there existed a "complementary" relationship;(3) neither external regulation nor internal governance had significant effect to the change of investment risks,and there was no "substitution" or "complementary" relationships.更多还原