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青藏高原草地生态补偿博弈分析

An Analysis on the Gaming of Ecological Compensation of Grassland in Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau

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【作者】 刘兴元巩建锋牟月亭

【Author】 LIU Xing-yuan1,2,GONG Jian-feng1,MU Yue-ting3(1.College of Pastoral Agricultural Science and Technology,Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730020,China;2.State Key Laboratory of Grassland Agro-ecosystems, Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730020,China;3.College of Economy and Management,Gansu Agricultural University,Lanzhou 730070,China)

【机构】 兰州大学草地农业科技学院兰州大学草地农业生态系统国家重点实验室甘肃农业大学经济管理学院

【摘要】 草地生态补偿是一种恢复青藏高原退化草地、协调区域经济发展、保护草地生态屏障和解决社会公平的重要经济手段。然而,在实施草地生态补偿的过程中,政府与牧民和牧民与牧民之间的博弈会采取不同的博弈策略,只有在政府选择补偿和牧民选择保护的均衡策略时,才能解决政府与牧民博弈的"囚徒困境"问题;而解决草地生态补偿中牧民之间"智猪博弈"困局的关键是寻求一个集体利益最优的纳什均衡解。因此,只有在草地生态补偿中政府与牧民和牧民与牧民之间形成一种合作的均衡博弈,才能实现青藏高原草地生态系统的可持续发展。

【Abstract】 Ecological compensation of grassland is an important economic means for restoring degradation grassland,coordinating region economic development,protecting ecological safety shelter zone and solving social equity in Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau.However,the gaming between government and herdsman as well as inter herdsman will adopt different strategy in the ecological compensation of grassland process.While only leveling strategy that government select compensation strategy and herdsman select conservation strategy at the same time will be adopted,the prisoner’s dilemma of ecological compensation can be solved between government and herdsman.And that the key to the pigs gaming of ecological compensation lies in an equilibrium solution of Nash,which seeks a solution of optimal collective interests.Therefore,government and herdsman as well as inter herdsman only form a cooperative equilibrium gaming on the ecological compensation of grassland,sustainable development of grassland ecosystem can be achieved in Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau.

【关键词】 青藏高原草地生态补偿博弈
【Key words】 Qinghai-Tibetan PlateauGrasslandEcological compensationGame
【基金】 国家自然科学基金项目(41071342)资助
  • 【文献出处】 中国草地学报 ,Chinese Journal of Grassland , 编辑部邮箱 ,2012年04期
  • 【分类号】X171;F224.32
  • 【被引频次】22
  • 【下载频次】582
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