【摘要】 随着转型期地方政府竞争的加剧,地方国有上市公司成为政府干预的重要载体。企业生命周期的异质性对政府干预下的企业并购有着怎样的影响机制与绩效差异?本文以2006～2008年间发生的地方国有上市公司并购事件为样本,研究地方政府干预对处于不同生命周期企业的并购绩效的影响。研究发现,政府干预下的企业并购绩效呈现生命周期差异。具体来说,较高的政府干预对处在成长期的地方国有企业的并购绩效有负面影响;而处在成熟期的地方国有企业并购行为,在较高政府干预情形下,绩效能够得到明显改善。这些发现对于地方政府在区域竞争加剧背景下的经济干预行为具有参考和启示价值,在理论上为政府干预理论的结构主义与新古典主义争论提供了经验支持,也是对法和金融理论框架下"政府掠夺之手理论"和"政府支持之手理论"的丰富与拓展。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the increased competition of local government in the transitional period,the local governmentcontrolled listed enterprises have become the important carriers of government intervention.What is the impact of the heterogeneity of corporate life cycle to the corporate M&A mechanism and performance under government intervention? Using a sample of M&A with local government-controlled listed enterprises,we examine the effects of corporate M&A under government intervention in different corporate life cycle.It is found that M&A performance under government intervention shows the difference in different corporate life cycle.Specifically, higher level of government intervention has a negative impact on M&A performance for growing local government-controlled enterprises,while a positive impact on the M&A performance of local government-controlled enterprises in mature period.In the context of the aggravated regional competition,these results indicate reference and revelation value for government economic intervention behavior.Simultaneously,these findings not only provide empirical support for government intervention in the theory of structuralism and neo-classical argument, but also richen and expand the government "grabbing-hand model" and "helping-hand model" in the framework of law and finance theory.更多还原