【摘要】 由于借款人还款决策存在策略互补性,小额信贷公司面临恐慌性逃债问题。借助惩罚承诺与合适的融资结构安排,小额信贷公司可以缓解恐慌性逃债。本文在全局博弈的框架下对此展开了研究并发现:(1)小额信贷公司存在约定过高的惩罚力度的激励,而过高的惩罚承诺会降低小额信贷公司实际执行惩罚承诺的可信度,加剧恐慌性逃债;(2)小额信贷公司私人最优的资本充足率低于社会最优水平,政府对小额信贷公司的资本充足率进行监管有其存在必要性;(3)资本充足率的提高,可以降低小额信贷公司约定的惩罚力度,从而增强惩罚承诺的可信度,缓解恐慌性逃债。基于本文的模型,我们就缓解恐慌性逃债提出了一些政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Due to borrowers’ strategic complementarities in deciding whether to repay or not, microfinance institutions (MFIs) may suffer borrower runs. By promising punishment for defaulters and choosing suitable capital structure, MFIs can mitigate borrower runs. Studying borrower runs problem in a global game framework, we find: (1) MFIs have incentive to promise too heavy punishment while promising too heavy punishment will reduce credibility of punishment commitment when borrowers avoid paying debts, which may exacerbate borrower runs; (2) As MFIs’ private optimal capital ratio is below the social optimal level, government should regulate their capital ratios. (3) The effect of raising capital ratio on mitigating borrower runs is mainly due to decreasing the level of punishment commitment and thus increasing credibility of punishment commitment. Based on our model, we can provide policy suggestions for mitigating borrower runs in microfinance.更多还原