【摘要】 本文以2004～2006年非金融行业上市公司为样本,将管理层与股东、终极控制人与中小股东之间的代理冲突置于同一框架下,考察管理层激励与股权融资成本的关系,以及这种关系是否会受到终极控制人与中小股东之间代理冲突的影响;进一步结合终极控制人性质,检验管理者权力对股权融资成本的直接负面影响及对管理层激励与股权融资成本关系的影响。实证研究发现:管理层货币薪酬激励有助于降低股权融资成本,而管理层持股比例对股权融资成本没有显著影响。终极控制人的两权分离程度及管理者权力均弱化了管理层激励对股权融资成本的降低效应,而终极控制人的现金流权则对管理层激励与股权融资成本的负相关关系具有强化作用,且终极控制人的政府性质对管理者权力所产生的负面影响有抑制作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the data of Chinese non-financial listed companies from 2004 to 2006,and placing the agency conflicts between management and shareholders,the ultimate controller and minority shareholders in a framework,this paper investigates the relationship between management incentives and the cost of equity capital,and examines whether this relationship is influenced by the agency conflict between the ultimate controller and minority shareholders.Combined with the nature of the firms’ ultimate controller,it further investigates whether the cost of equity capital itself and the relationship between management incentives and the cost of equity capital is influenced by managerial power.Empirical results show that managers’ monetary compensation helps reduce the cost of equity capital,while manager’s ownership of equity has no significant effects on the cost of equity capital.The degree of separation of two rights of ultimate controller and managerial power weakens the effect of management incentives on lowering the cost of equity capital.While the cash-flow rights of ultimate controller enhances the negative correlation between management incentive and the cost of equity capital.And the government identity of ultimate controller can inhibit the negative impact of the manager’s power on the cost of equity capital.更多还原