【摘要】 本文分析了机构投资者在完善上市公司治理结构、约束管理层盈余管理中的作用。首先通过管理者与机构投资者的博弈分析发现,当机构持股比例很低时,机构不存在监管意愿,只有当机构持股比例较高时,才会积极地监管盈余管理。其次,以2004-2006年沪深两市的上市公司为样本,通过实证研究发现盈余管理与机构投资者持股之间存在倒U型关系,持股比例13.07%是机构投资者是否有效抑制盈余管理行为的临界值;盈余管理程度与机构股东的数量呈正相关关系,即随着上市公司中机构股东数量的增加,机构的监管效率会下降。更多还原

【Abstract】 The research analyzes the role of institutional investors in improving corporate governance and constraining earnings management.First,we find,through a game theory model,that the institutional investor is less likely to restrict earnings management when their shares are too small.They will have incentive to monitor earnings management when they have a substantial shareholding.Second,we prove the existence of the invert U-ship by empirical regression with the sample of listed companies in 2004 to 2006 and find 13.07% is the critical shareholding proportion whether institutional investor wants to monitor earnings management.And we also find the earnings management is positively related to the number of institutional shareholders.Monitoring efficiency is decreasing as the number of institutional shareholder is increasing.更多还原