【摘要】 依据不完全契约思想,建立数学模型探索进入权、所有权和知识等变量对专用性投资激励的作用机制,并通过逆向归纳法分析进入权、专用性投资和知识对创新治理模式的影响方式及微观机理.研究结果表明:充分的进入权在物质资产密集型企业总是最优;对于知识资产来说容易出现为适应知识的互补性而投资不足或是为侵占知识而过度投资两种情况;进入权对专用性投资的激励作用是对称的而所有权是非对称的.研究结论对指导企业创新治理模式选择具有重要意义.更多还原

【Abstract】 According to the theory of incomplete contract, the variables such as access, ownership and knowledge are studied in a mathematical model to explore the incentive effect of these variables on specificity investment, and the influence way and mechanism of these variables on the innovation governance mode are analyzed through backward induction method. The results show that full access in physical-assets intensive enterprise is always optimal; both under-investment to adapt to the knowledge complementary and over-investment to steal knowledge are easy to appear for knowledge assets; the incentive effect of access on specificity investment is symmetric while that of ownership is asymmetric. These conclusions are important for enterprises to choose innovation governance mode.更多还原