【摘要】 在建筑企业与政府安全监管部门仅具有有限理性的前提下,运用演化博弈方法对建筑工程安全监管过程中,建筑企业安全生产策略选择与政府监管部门监管策略选择的互动行为及稳定状态进行了分析,并以建筑企业为算例,运用具体数据,对双方的策略选择进行了讨论。结果表明:建筑工程安全监管稳定状态与建筑企业采取安全措施的成本、建筑安全事故发生概率、事故发生后建筑企业所受损失、政府监管部门的监管成本、惩罚力度等因素相关。依据分析结果提出了建筑工程有效安全监管的措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the assumption that both the construction enterprise and supervision department have bounded rationality,the interaction mechanism and stable state between the safety production strategy of construction enterprise and the supervision strategy of supervision department is analyzed with evolutionary game theory in this paper.A numerical example is given for construction enterprise and the strategy that enterprise and supervision department will chose is discussed.The results demonstrate that the stable state of construction safety supervision is related to certain key factors including cost of regulatory procedures,probability of accidents,loss of construction enterprises resulted from accidents,cost of safety supervision and penalty strength.Based on the analysis,several effective measures for construction safety supervision are presented.更多还原