【摘要】 企业联盟决策机构的席位分配和各成员在决策机构中的实际势力是联盟成员最为关心的问题,也是结盟是否成功的关键之一.将席位分配与势力分布作为一个有机整体综合研究,建立了企业联盟决策机构席位最优公平分配模型,给出了确定企业联盟决策机构对应的最佳加权选举系统的方法,求出了企业联盟决策机构的最优席位总数、各成员拥有的席位数、通过决议的法定票数以及各成员的Shapley-Shubik势力指数,并使企业联盟决策机构的席位分配和势力分布均与各成员的持股比例尽可能一致,从而使各成员在联盟决策机构中的席位分配和势力分布更加合理.通过势力分析,给出了联盟决策机构决策过程中各成员之间相互博弈的位次竞争策略.更多还原

【Abstract】 The seat apportionment among different shareholders in an enterprise alliance decision-making body(EADMB)and the actual power of each shareholder are the issues the shareholders are deeply concerned about.And they are the keys to successfully allying either.On the basis of a comprehensive study of the seat apportionment and distribution of the powers,this paper proposes an optimal fair apportionment model of the seats within an EADMB,advances a new method to establish the optimal weighted voting system of EADMB,and determines the optimal total number of the seats,the seats to each shareholder,legal ballots of passing a resolution and the Shapley-Shubik power indexes of the shareholders, so as to have the seat apportionment and the power distributing of the shareholders consistent with their holdings in EADMB as much as possible,and the seat apportionment and the power distribution of the shareholders more rationalized.At last,we suggest the rank competition strategies of the shareholders in the process of decision-making in EADMB.更多还原