【摘要】 委托代理问题是公司治理中的经典话题,而主权财富基金这一特殊投资主体的公司治理尤其被关注.本文旨在区别主权财富基金与其他国有资产管理机构的委托代理问题,并设计有效的激励约束机制来规范其商业化运作.在明确主权财富基金独特属性的基础上,文章改进了私有产权下的委托代理模型,提出了适合主权财富基金的在公有产权下的制度化模型.研究表明,制度不仅左右博弈双方的行为,也左右外生的博弈规则;主权财富基金公司治理中最主要的问题在于激励约束机制的设计,以及存在保障该机制有效运行的制度环境;随着制度建设的深化,主权财富基金的风险敞口和代理成本逐渐降低,从而有望改善公司治理.更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper explores corporate governance in Sovereign Wealth Funds and puts forward an institutionalized principle-agent model in framework of public ownership.Compared by other state-owned assets management institutions,SWFs have several characteristics,such as state-owned assets,diversified investment purposes,long investment horizon,heavily influenced by government,and limited information,etc.It is found that the primary element in SWF′s corporate governance lies in an incentive and restraining mechanism,and a favorable institutional environment.Risk exposure in SWF is expected to shrink with improvement in institutional environment,which in turn would save agent costs and improve corporate governance as well.更多还原