【摘要】 随着中国市场经济的发展以及国企改革的不断深入,非控股国有股权在中国上市公司中变得越来越普遍。该文作者发现,当国有股权处于非控股状态时,公司过度投资的症状变得更加严重。进一步的分析表明:当国有股权处于非控股地位时,一方面国有股权带给公司的政治关系使得公司比不存在国有股权的公司更有能力获得投资资源,另一方面管理层受到的监督与约束少于国有控股的公司,因此过度投资的症状更加严重,公司的业绩也相应较低。以上发现表明,非控股国有股权具有其独特的代理问题,这对于改善经济效率和国有资产管理都有一定的启示。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the financial market development and the state-owned enterprise(SOE) reform,non-controlling state ownership becomes more and more popular among China’s publically listed firms.The authors find that firms with non-controlling state ownership are more likely to over-invest.Further analyses show that,on the one hand,like firms with controlling state ownership,firms with non-controlling state ownership have access to more resources to finance their investment;however,on the other hand,these firms may be associated with less monitoring incentives from the government.These two factors work together and lead to more overinvestment and poorer performance.The results indicate that non-controlling state ownership may bring some unique agency problems,which shed light on the social efficiency and the state-owned asset management.更多还原