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基于博弈论的食品安全监管分析

Dynamic Game between Enterprise and Supervision Department in the View of Food Safety

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【作者】 左伟潘涌璋

【Author】 ZUO Wei12,PAN Yongzhang3(1.School of Management,SUN YAT-SEN University,Guangzhou 510275,China; 2.College of Economics and Management,South China Agricultural University,Guangzhou 510642,China; 3.School of Science and Engineering,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)

【机构】 中山大学管理学院华南农业大学经济管理学院暨南大学理工学院

【摘要】 从博弈论角度分析我国食品安全中的监管问题,建立和分析了地方监管部门与中央监管部门的博弈模型,结合"三鹿奶粉"事件分析认为,作为社会利益的代表,中央政府必须承担起相应责任,加强对地方部门的监管,以免其与企业合谋,并调整其激励机制,明确其责任追索制度;最后结合最新刑法修正案提出的问责制建议营造重视食品安全的软环境。

【Abstract】 This article analyzes the reasons why food safety problems often appear in China from the game view.It sets up dynamic game models of local regulatory authorities and the central regulatory authorities.It points out that Central Government must bear the corresponding responsibility as the social interest representatives,strengthen the supervision of local departments,and adjust its incentive mechanism.Finally the author suggests creating the food safety-oriented atmosphere by means of offering a soft environment of food safety such as credibility,social culture,etc.

【关键词】 食品安全监管部门博弈
【Key words】 food safetyenterprisesupervision departmentdynamic game
【基金】 国家社会科学基金项目(10BGL007)
  • 【文献出处】 科技管理研究 ,Science and Technology Management Research , 编辑部邮箱 ,2011年23期
  • 【分类号】F203;F224.32
  • 【被引频次】27
  • 【下载频次】832
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