【摘要】 从委托代理视角看,民间组织参与农村公共服务有直接委托代理模式和间接委托代理模式两种。其中的代理人问题具有复杂性,不仅存在一般委托代理关系中由于信息不对称所造成的代理人问题,还存在由代理人和委托人自身的特殊性所导致的代理人问题。应创设一种由"问责激励"、声誉激励和长期契约激励等组成的多元激励策略,并使问责激励和声誉激励机制嵌入在长期契约之中,以激励代理人更好地向委托人目标努力,实现农民作为初始委托人的利益最优化。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the perspective of principal - agent theory,there exist two kinds of principal - agent models to nongovernmental organizations participating public services in rural areas:direct model and indirect model.In which,the agency problems are complex,which not only from the asymmetric information in general principal - agent relationship,but also from their own specificity of principal and agent.We should create the multiple motivational strategies including,the accountability incentive,reputation incentive and long- term contract incentive,and accountability incentive and reputation incentive should be embedded in long - term contracts,to encourage the agent better strive for the goal of principal, and to achieve the interests of farmers as the initial principal.更多还原