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高管持股与盈余稳健性:协同效应与堑壕效应

Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism:Alignment Effect andEntrenchment Effect

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【作者】 李伟周林洁吴联生

【Author】 LI Wei1,ZHOU Lin-jie2,WU Lian-sheng1(1.Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871;2.Department of Economics,China Youth University for Political Sciences,Beijing 100089,China)

【机构】 北京大学光华管理学院中国青年政治学院经济系

【摘要】 本文研究了高管持股与盈余稳健性的协同效应与堑壕效应。研究发现,上市公司对盈余稳健性的需求与高管持股呈非线性的关系。在高管持股水平较低和较高的区间,高管持股具有协同效应,高管持股与盈余稳健性呈负相关关系;在高管持股的中间水平,高管持股具有堑壕效应,高管持股与盈余稳健性呈正相关关系。

【Abstract】 In the paper,we examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism.Evidence is found that the relationship between managerial ownership and demand for accounting conservatism is no monotonic.Within the low and high levels of managerial ownership,managerial ownership is much negatively related to the accounting conservatism,which is consistent with the implication of alignment effect.Significantly positive relationship is found between managerial ownership and accounting conservatism,which is consistent with the implication of entrenchment effect.

【基金】 北京市教委科技创新平台-服务业发展战略研究(PXM2011-014221-113500),北京市教委人才强教深化计划—企业管理创新团队资助(PXM2011-014221-113526)
  • 【文献出处】 财经论丛 ,Collected Essays on Finance and Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2011年06期
  • 【分类号】F224;F276.6
  • 【被引频次】39
  • 【下载频次】1379
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