【摘要】 通过仿真实验分析囚徒困境博弈在群聚性可变的无标度网络上的演化,进而考察无标度网络的群聚性对合作行为的影响.实验结果表明,无标度网络的群聚性对合作行为的影响依赖于度量个体博弈收益的效用函数.一方面,当效用函数考虑关系成本并以平均收益度量个体的博弈收益时,无标度网络的群聚性抑制合作行为.另一方面,当效用函数同时考虑关系成本和无标度网络中hub节点所具有的资源优势,并以平均收益和累积收益的加权平均度量个体的博弈收益时,随着累积收益权重的增大,无标度网络的群聚性对合作行为的影响逐渐由抑制作用转变为促进作用.更多还原

【Abstract】 Using simulation experiments,this paper analyzes the evolution of the prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks with tunable clustering,and examines the effect of clustering in scale-free networks on the cooperative behavior.The results show that the effect of clustering in scale-free network on cooperative behavior depends on the utility function which is used to measure the gains of individuals in the game.On the one hand,when the cost of links is considered in the utility function,the gains of individual can be calculated with average payoff.In this case,the clustering in scale-free networks has negative effect on the evolution of cooperative behavior.On the other hand,when the cost of links and resource advantage of hub nodes are considered at the same time in the utility function,the gains of individuals can be calculated with the weighted average of average payoff and accumulated payoff.In this case,the negative effect of clustering in scale-free networks on cooperative behavior changes gradually into the positive one with the increase of the weight of accumulated payoff.更多还原