【摘要】 研究经营者激励机制对企业技术创新的影响是现代企业管理的重要内容。以中国2004-2007年372家上市公司的数据为样本,探讨经营者激励机制与技术创新之间的关系并对其进行了实证研究。研究发现:由于国有企业的所有权和经营权的分离程度较高,技术创新代理行为的影响要甚于民营企业,因此经营者持股极少,较高的技术创新动力只能来自于边际激励效应。通过采用White-Heteroskedasticity方法对模型进行异方差检验,结果表明:经营者拥有剩余索取权有利于企业的技术创新;国有企业经营者拥有剩余索取权对企业技术创新的影响程度要高于民营企业。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper analyzes,theoretically,the relationship between the mechanism of manager’s incentive arrangement and technical innovation.Because the choice of manager’s incentive arrangement impact on the technical innovation is an important of modern enterprise management.Further,paper through the use of White-Heteroskedasticity method that based on the cross-section and panel data of 372 Chinese listed companies in 7 industries from 2004 to 2007,the above qualitative analyses have been tested empirically.The conclusions are as follow :it can enhance the efficiency of innovation decision and resource allocation through implementing the incentive mechanism that managers have residual claim.One point which is worth emphasizing is that the effect of management stock-holding on technical innovation in state-owned enterprises is higher than that in non state-owned enterprises because the agency behavior of technical innovation derived from the separation of ownership and operation in state-owned enterprises is more serious than that in non state-owned enterprises.Accordingly,the paper proposes some suggestions of policy.更多还原