【摘要】 本文基于上市公司股东和经理层之间的委托代理关系,以2002～2006年526家上市公司为研究对象,从经理层对董事会控制程度、经理层激励约束机制以及总经理任职方式三个方面对上市公司现金持有的影响进行了研究。研究结果表明:经理层对董事会控制能力越强的公司会持有越多的现金;现行激励约束机制不能对经理层高现金持有的自利行为进行抑制;总经理在大股东单位任职和两职合一会使上市公司持有大量现金。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and managers,this paper studies the effect of manager- lever mechanisms on corporate cash holdings from three aspects: the proportion of executive directors in the board of directors, manager-lever incentive and restraint mechanisms,and the appointment of general manager. The data of 526 listed corporations from 2002 to 2006 are chosen to make empirical studies,and the results are: companies have large proportion of executive directors hold more cash; incentive and restraint mechanisms fail to restraint manager’s self-interested behavior;double control of large shareholder and manager cause much more cash holding.更多还原