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学术期刊投稿的筛选机理研究——基于编辑与作者的信息不对称视角

Analysis on the Selecting Mechanism for Papers Submitted to Academic Periodicals:Based on Asymmetric Information between Editors and Authors

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【作者】 周斌

【Author】 ZHOU Bin (Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100026,China)

【机构】 首都经济贸易大学

【摘要】 投稿的学术质量决定了学术期刊的质量。在对投稿学术质量的评判上,编辑和作者之间存在信息不对称。利用不完全信息博弈模型分析编辑和作者之间的博弈过程,有助于明晰学术期刊投稿筛选的内在机理。针对二者间的信息不对称,建立有效的信息传递机制、编辑学者化和专家审稿是提高学术期刊选稿水平的有效途径。

【Abstract】 The academic level of papers submitted is decisive to academic periodicals.There are asymmetric information between editors and authors in evaluating the academic level of papers submitted.This paper builds a game model with incomplete information to analyze the game between editors and authors,which helps the selecting mechanism for the papers more understandable.As for the asymmetric information,effective mechanism for information transfer,academic editors and experts evaluation will make it more effective for selecting papers submitted.

【关键词】 学术期刊编辑作者信息不对称博弈
【Key words】 academic periodicalseditorauthorasymmetric informationgame
  • 【文献出处】 首都经济贸易大学学报 ,Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business , 编辑部邮箱 ,2010年03期
  • 【分类号】G232
  • 【下载频次】246
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