【摘要】 供应链风险偏好问题是当前的研究热点,以往学者在研究供应链协调策略时多考虑供应链成员是风险中性的情形,较少考虑当供应链成员为风险追逐或风险厌恶的情形。本文在总结前人研究结果的基础上建立了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链模型,双方构成了一个Stackelberg主从博弈模型,供应商为领导者,零售商为追随者。并假设该供应链模型在随机市场需求条件下,采用供应链补偿策略及回购契约进行协调。在此基础上,本文研究了当供应链有一方是风险追逐而另一方是风险中性条件下的供应链协调策略,并将结论与供应链双方均为风险中性条件下的协调策略进行了对比分析,分别得出了不同风险偏好组合条件下,供应商和零售商的最优协调策略。最后得出结论:无论供应链成员的风险偏好如何,当供应商将订货补偿策略与回购契约一起使用时,可以在保持回购价格不变的情况下达到供应链的协调。更多还原

【Abstract】 Supply chain risk preference is the current research focus.When the former scholars studied the supply chain coordination strategies,most of them just took account of the situation that the supply chain members were risk neutral and did not consider the situations that the supply chain members were risk aversion or risk chasing.Based on the summarization of the previous studies,this paper establishes a supply chain model which includes one supplier and one retailer.Both the supplier and the retailer constitute a Stackelberg model.Under the condition of stochastic market demands,this paper uses supply chain return policy and buy back contract to study the supply chain coordination policy when one of the supply chain members is risk chasing and the other is risk neutral.And then this paper analyzes the result with the situation when supply chain members are risk-neutral.At last,this paper gets the supply chain coordination strategy under various risk attitudes portfolios and gets a conclusion that regardless of the risk preference of the supply chain members,when supplier adopts the supply chain return policy and buy back contract together,the supply chain can achieves coordination without changing the buyback price.更多还原