【摘要】 本文构建了一个在投资成本与收益不对称的情况下基于增长型实物期权的企业并购两阶段博弈模型。该模型使用二叉树期权定价方法确定企业并购中产生的增长型实物期权的价值,考虑了并购各阶段的投入成本、投资收益、风险中性概率、无风险收益率以及企业并购时产生的相互影响效应等因素,分析了成本占优或收益占优的两企业间在公司并购中的行为模式,得到了两企业项目并购成功所对应的临界收益和临界成本以及与上述因素之间的关系。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper establishes a two-stage game model on M&A based on the growth real option under the condition of asymmetry cost and benefit of investment.In this model,the value of gowth real option arising from M&A is determined by using the binary tree method,and the investment cost,investment income,risk-neutral probability,risk-free rate of return in various stages of M&A as well as effects between enterprises are considered.And it analyzes the behaviors of two enterprises with advantages in cost or benefit in M&A.Finally,it gets critical benefit and cost when two corporations successfully M&A as well as the relationship between these with influencing factors.更多还原