节点文献

股权结构、债务治理与“效率悖论”——基于A股上市公司的经验数据

Ownership Structure,Debt Governance and Paradox on Efficiency:Evidence from A-Share Listed Companies in China

  • 推荐 CAJ下载
  • PDF下载
  • 不支持迅雷等下载工具,请取消加速工具后下载。

【作者】 杜宏宇

【Author】 DU Hong-yu1,2(1.Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, Jiangxi, 330013, China;2.Shandong University at Weihai, Weihai, Shandong, 264209, China)

【机构】 江西财经大学经济学院山东大学威海分校

【摘要】 我国上市公司债务治理效应整体偏弱,公司业绩与债务水平显著负相关,但由于直接财务效应影响的差异性,以及债务期限结构、公司控制人性质、股权集中度和流通股比重等因素的作用,使债务水平具有较好的托宾Q效应,从而出现"效率悖论"现象。改善债务期限结构,增强金融机构对外信贷的预算约束和监控力度,加强国有投资主体对控股公司的约束力,强化股权制衡关系,加强证券市场建设,是解决这一问题的主要途径。

【Abstract】 It should be pointed out that the debt governance effect in listed companies is weak, and company performance is negatively correlated with debt level. Owing to the difference of the direct financial effect, debt maturity structure, company controllers’ character, equity concentration and the proportion of tradable equity, there is a conspicuous Tobin-Q effect on debt level. Furthermore, there comes a phenomenon of "paradox on efficiency". In order to solve this problem, we should improve debt maturity structure, increase the budget constraint and monitoring intensity of financial institutions’ external credit, strengthen the constraint of state-owned investment entities to companies, intensify the relationship of ownership restriction, and deepen the reform in stock right decentralized allot revolution.

  • 【文献出处】 经济管理 ,Economic Management Journal , 编辑部邮箱 ,2010年09期
  • 【分类号】F224;F276.6;F832.51
  • 【被引频次】8
  • 【下载频次】459
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络